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Constitutional Law 
by James E. Leahy* 
This was an eventful year in the field of constitutional law. 
The court upheld the right of individuals to distribute anti-
war literature within a railway station, struck down an in-
junction prohibiting county employees from peaceful picket-
ing, upheld an ordinance punishing conduct which urges a 
riot or which urges others to commit acts of force or violence, 
and held the California loyalty oath unconstitutional. 
A public transit district which permits commercial ads in its 
motor buses must now accept ads designed to influence public 
opinion on political, social, and economic matters. 
The right to remain anonymous while expressing one's views 
was extended to include recorded telephone messages, and a 
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political party's newspaper was held exempt from a newspaper 
licensing tax. 
Pandering is not part of the definition of obscenity in Cali-
fornia, so said the supreme court. 
"Good moral character" was said to be too vague a standard 
for the licensing of theaters, but this raises the question of 
whether it is also too vague as a standard for determining 
who may receive a license to practice an occupation or pro-
fession. 
The right to wear a beard was denied a high school student 
based on a finding that benefits to the public outweigh the 
infringement upon that right. 
Resort to the equal protection clause proved futile, and it 
appears that the appellate courts in California have rendered 
it about as dead as the United States Supreme Court has 
rendered the privileges and immunities clause. 
Many other constitutional issues were before the courts in 
the past year. Some of these are reviewed in this article, but 
others not considered as important have been omitted. 
First Amendment 
Expression-Related Activities 
Although the First Amendment protects against "abridging 
the freedom of speech," the protection afforded by that amend-
ment is not limited to verbal expressions. Many activities may 
be expression-related to such a degree as to be entitled to 
First Amendment protection. Among the kinds of activities 
which fall into this category are the distribution of printed 
material/ peaceful picketing,2 parading,3 demonstrating,4 
sitting in,5 soliciting,S and the providing of group legal serv-
ices.7 
1. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 
444, 82 L.Ed. 949, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1939). 
2. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 
88, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940). 
3. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 
569, 85 L.Ed. 1049, 61 S.Ct. 762, 133 
A.L.R. 1396 (1941). 
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4. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 
13 L.Ed.2d 471, 85 S.Ct. 453 (1965). 
5. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 
15 L.Ed.2d 637, 86 S.Ct. 719 (1966). 
6. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 
313, 2 L.Ed.2d 302, 78 S.Ct. 277 
(1958). 
7. United Mine Workers v. Illinois 
2
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In summing up its approach to these expression-related 
activity cases, the United States Supreme Court in the recent 
case of United States v. O'Brien8 set forth its general approach 
to the question this way: 
This Court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" 
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating 
the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations 
on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the 
quality of the governmental interest which must appear, 
the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: 
compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; co-
gent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these 
terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is 
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power 
of the government; if it furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interests; if the governmental in-
terest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amend-
ment freedom is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest. 9 
The appellate courts of California were presented with 
several expression-related activity cases this past year. The 
supreme court confronted the problem first in the case of In re 
Hoffman. 10 In this case petitioners were convicted of violating 
a Los Angeles ordinance that restricted the right to be in a 
railway station. ll The petitioners entered the Los Angeles 
State Bar, 389 U.S. 217, 19 L.Ed.2d 
426, 88 S.Ct. 353 (1967); Brotherhood 
of Railway Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 
U.S. 1, 12 L.Ed.2d 89, 84 S.Ct. 1113, 
11 A.L.R.3d 1196 (1964). 
8. 391 U.S. 367, 20 L.Ed.2d 672, 88 
S.Ct. 1673 (1968). Hereafter the term 
"Supreme Court" will be used to refer 
to the United States Supreme Court. 
9. 391 U.S. at 372, 20 L.Ed.2d at 
679-680, 88 S.Ct. at 1678-79. 
17 
10. 67 Cal.2d 845, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 
434 P.2d 353 (1967). 
11. Los Angeles Municipal Code 
§ 421.11.1: "It shall be unlawful for 
any person to loaf or loiter in any wait-
ing room, lobby . . . of any railway 
station . . . airport or bus depot 
. . . or to remain in any such station, 
airport, or depot . . . for a period 
of time longer than reasonably neces-
sary to transact such business as such 
person may have to transact with any 
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Union Station and began to distribute leaflets protesting the 
Vietnam war. They did not interfere with the free flow of 
traffic nor with other persons in the station. The police were 
called and, after determining that the petitioners were engaged 
in activities prohibited by the ordinance, they were asked to 
leave. When they refused to do so, petitioners were arrested, 
charged with a violation of the ordinance, and found guilty. 
In challenging the constitutionality of the conviction the 
court pointed out that First Amendment activities can be regu-
lated on streets and in parks only upon a showing of "a valid 
municipal interest that cannot be protected by different or 
more narrow means. »12 Even then the regulations are limited 
"to the extent necessary to prevent interference with the muni-
cipality's interest in protecting the public health, safety, or 
order or in assuring the efficient and orderly use of the streets 
and parks for their primary purposes."lS Although O'Brien 
had not yet been decided, it appears that the test used by the 
California Supreme Court contains the same basic criteria as 
the United States Supreme Court's statement in that case, when 
referring to expression-related activities upon public property. 
The station in HofJman, however, was private property open 
to the public upon the general invitation of the owner. The 
court hurdled this problem by pointing out that the rule with 
regard to such activities on streets and in parks applied even 
though the street was in a privately owned town. The court 
cited Marsh v. Alabama14 wherein the Supreme Court had 
reversed a conviction of an individual for distributing religious 
literature on the sidewalk of a company-owned town contrary 
to regulations of the town management. 
It seems dubious that either Marsh, or its companion case 
Tucker v. Texas15 (where the town was owned by the United 
States), provide authority for extending the rule referred to 
common carrier using . . . such 14. 326 U.S. 501, 90 L.Ed. 265, 66 
station, airport, or depot, . .." S.Ct.276 (1946). 
12. 67 Cal.2d at 849, 64 Cal. Rptr. 15. 326 U.S. 517, 90 L.Ed. 274, 66 
at 99, 434 P.2d at 355. S.Ct. 274 (1946). 
13. 67 Cal.2d at 849, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
at 99, 434 P.2d at 355. 
258 CAL LAW 1969 
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above to private property which has been opened to the public 
for business purposes. In Marsh there was a town with 
streets, sidewalks and stores, just like any other municipality, 
although completely company-owned. In Marsh the curtailing 
of First Amendment activities on the streets of Chicksaw, Ala-
bama, not only would have deprived the distributee of his 
right to express his views, but also would have deprived the 
citizens thereof of the liberties guaranteed by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments for no justifiable reason. 
These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free 
citizens of their State and country. Just as all other 
citizens they must make decisions which affect the welfare 
of community and nation. To act as good citizens they 
must be informed. In order to enable them to be prop-
erly informed their information must be uncensored.16 
It is clear that if those wishing to distribute literature 
could not do so upon the streets of Chicksaw, Alabama, then 
their right to be heard, and the right of the citizens of the 
town to hear, would have been seriously curtailed. The same 
cannot be said of the situation at Union Station from the view-
point of either those desiring to express their views or of the 
potential recipients of those views. The streets around the 
station were certainly open to those desiring to distribute their 
materiaP7 and the patrons of the railway could have been con-
tacted as they arrived at or left the station. 
If the rule which applies to public places is to apply to 
the inside of a railway station, it would seem appropriate to 
ask to what other areas of privately owned property does the 
rule apply? Would the same rule apply to an airport, to a 
department store, or to a hotel lobby? 
In Hoffman the court used as a test whether or not the 
16. 326 u.s. at 508, 90 L.Ed. at 269-
270, 66 S.Ct. at 279. 
17. In a footnote to this case the 
court cites Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 
147, 84 L.Ed. 155, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939) 
for the proposition that expression can· 
not be abridged by simply saying that 
it may be exercised at some other place. 
In Schneider, however, the choice was 
not between a public place and private 
property, but was a case in which ex· 
pression·related activities were pro· 
hibited in certain public places and per· 
mitted at others. 
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conduct interfered with the use of the premises as a railway 
station. 
Similarly in the present case, the test is not whether pe-
titioners' use of the station was a railway use but whether 
it interfered with that use. IS (Emphasis added.) 
In arriving at this test the court referred to Brown v. Louisi-
anaI9 wherein the Supreme Court struck down a conviction 
under a breach of peace statute for sitting in at a public 
library. In Brown the facts indicated that the defendants did 
not interfere with the use of the library nor were they dis-
orderly or noisy. The library, however, was a public facility. 
Further, the defendants were protesting because they were 
barred from using it because of their race. They were pe-
titioning the government, which operated the library, to dis-
continue its illegal segregation policy. This is quite different 
from the petitioners' situation insofar as the railway station 
was concerned. They were not barred from the station, nor 
discriminated against by the owner or by the city in its use. 
If interference with use is to be the test, it would seem to 
follow that non-interference with the use of any private facility 
which is open to the public would permit the same kind of ex-
pression-related activities which the court says were permissi-
ble in the station. 
Since the Hoffman decision the United States Supreme 
Court decided the case of Amalgamated Food Employees 
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza.20 In this case the 
court upheld the right to peacefully picket upon a privately 
owned shopping center which was open to the general public. 
In a case decided prior to Logan Valley Plaza, the California 
Supreme Court had reached the same result. 1 
These cases can be distinguished from Hoffman in that in 
the case of a shopping center there is factually a situation 
18. 67 Cal.2d at 851, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
at 100, 434 P.2d at 356. 
19. 383 U.S. 131, 15 L.Ed.2d 637, 
86 S.C!. 719 (1966). 
20. 391 U.S. 308, 20 L.Ed.2d 603, 
88 S.C!. 1601 (1968). 
260 CAL LAW 1969 
1. Schwartz-Torrance Investment 
Corp. v. Baker & Confectionery Work-
ers Union, Local 31, 61 Cal.2d 766, 40 
Cal. Rptr. 233, 394 P.2d 921 (1964), 
cert. den. 380 U.S. 906, 13 L.Ed.2d 794, 
85 S.C!. 888. 
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very similar to a company-owned town, as in Marsh. There 
are streets, sidewalks, and stores, and in some shopping centers, 
areas for rest and relaxation similar to parks. Further, one 
need only visit a modern-day shopping center to ask, if the 
employees cannot picket their employers upon the sidewalks 
and streets within the center, where can they picket? In 
many of today's shopping centers the right to picket would be 
nonexistent if picketing were prohibited therein because gen-
erally there are no public sidewalks or streets upon which to 
effectively picket. 
Freedom of expression must be protected. There is a great 
deal of difference, however, in expressing one's opinion in 
those areas traditionally open for that purpose and private 
property (open to the public) not traditionally used as places 
for expression. Confining expression-related activities to those 
areas traditionally open for such purposes2 is adequate pro-
tection for expression-related activities on some private prop-
erty, such as shopping centers, because they are like traditional 
public areas. The right of the actors to act, and the potential 
hearers to hear, would be seriously curtailed if such activities 
were prohibited on such property. A railway station (and 
other related private areas) is not an area where expression 
of this type is traditionally carried on. There are generally 
sidewalks and streets which can be used with little curtailment 
of the expression-related activities. The interests of the in-
dividual, the government, and the private owner are thus 
protected. 
A second expression-related activity case was presented to 
the supreme court in In re Berry.3 In this case the court held 
invalid an injunction issued in connection with a strike of 
county welfare workers, which prohibited: 
( 4) picketing or causing picketing, or "causing, parti-
cipating in or inducing others to participate in any demon-
stration or demonstrations" on any grounds or street or 
2. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 
39, 17 L.Ed.2d 149, 87 S.Ct. 242 
(1966). 
3. 68 Cal.2d 137, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 
436 P.2d 273 (1968). For further dis-
cussion of this case, see York, REME-
DIES, and Grodin, LABOR RELATIONS, in 
this volume. 
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sidewalk adjoining grounds owned or possessed by the 
County on which structures are located which are oc-
cupied by county employees or in which such employees 
"are assigned to work.,,4 
Before taking up the question of the constitutionality of 
the injunction the court pointed out that "[i]n this state it 
is clearly the law that the violation of an order in excess of the 
jurisdiction of the issuing court cannot produce a valid judg-
ment of contempt. ."5 The court added further that a 
court order violating a citizen's constitutional rights is void 
for lack of jurisdiction in the court to issue it. 6 
The real issue involved here was whether the injunction was 
unconstitutional. The court held: 
[T]his order is unconstitutionally overbroad in that it 
improperly restricts the exercise of First Amendment 
freedoms, and further that it is too vague and uncertain 
to satisfy the requirements of notice and fair trial which 
are inherent in the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 7 
The test to be used in such cases, the court stated, quoting 
from Thornhill is: 
Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion [i.e. peace-
ful picketing] can be justified only where the clear danger 
of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording 
no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition 
for acceptance in the market of public opinion.s 
4. 68 Ca1.2d at 151, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
at 282-283, 436 P.2d at 282-283. 
5. 68 Cal.2d at 147, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
at 280, 436 P.2d at 280. 
6. The court distinguished Walker v. 
City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 18 
L.Ed.2d 1210, 87 S.Ct. 1824 (1967) by 
concluding that what the United States 
Supreme Court held in that case was 
that the Alabama rule of law requiring 
resort to legal channels to contest the 
262 CAL LAW 1969 
validity of a court order affecting first 
amendment freedoms, rather than dis-
obey it and then contest the validity did 
not constitute an intrusion upon such 
freedoms. The rule in California is 
that an order void upon its face cannot 
support a contempt judgment. 
7. 68 Cal.2d at 151, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
at 283, 436 P.2d 283. 
8. 68 Ca1.2d at 153, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
at 284, 436 P.2d at 284. 
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On this basis the court concluded that "[t]he County has fallen 
far short of demonstrating a compelling public interest suffi-
cient to justify limitation of informational picketing and dem-
onstration per se in the locations where the order forbids 
such activities."9 
The court also concluded that in directing the order not only 
at the Union but also at other persons acting with them 
and the inclusion in the order of the phrase" , in concert among 
themselves' [there was injected] into the description a baffling 
element of uncertainty as to the application of the order"lo 
which made it vague and uncertain under the due process 
clause. 
The Berry case is significant not only because of its basic 
conclusion that this order was unconstitutional and as such 
could not support a contempt judgment; it is also significant 
because the court made no distinction as to the status of the 
petitioners who were private citizens and those petitioners to 
whom the order was primarily directed-the welfare workers. 
Thus under this decision public employees were accorded the 
same constitutional protection as private citizens.l1 
The constitutionality of a statute punishing expression-re-
lated conduct was before the supreme court in People v. 
Davis.12 The statute punishes one who engages in conduct 
which urges a riot or urges others to commit acts of force or 
violence. The record of the case did not contain evidence of 
the kind of conduct or what "urging" the defendant had en-
gaged in. The only question before the court was whether the 
statute was unconstitutional on its face. The statute refers 
to both acts or conduct which urge a riot, and to the mere 
"urging" of others to commit acts of force or violence. Con-
centrating on the second part, the court noted that what was 
being punished here was the urging of others to commit acts 
9. 68 Cal.2d at 154, 65 Cal. Rptr. at servant, 4 Cal. Western L. Rev. 1, 12 
284, 436 P.2d at 284. (1968). 
10. 68 Cal.2d at 156, 65 Cal. Rptr. 12. 68 Cal.2d 481, 67 Cal Rptr. 547, 
at 286, 436 P.2d at 286. 439 P.2d 651 (1968). For further dis-
11. See Leahy, The public employee cussion of this case, see Collings, CRIM-
and the first amendment-Must he INAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, in this 
sacrifice his civil rights to be a civil volume. 
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of violence, etc., which could be punished under the decision 
in Feiner v . New York .13 This case, the court argued, is dis-
tinguishable from Terminiello v. Chicago 14 in which the 
Supreme Court overturned a conviction of one who had been 
found guilty under jury instructions which permitted a finding 
of guilt if the defendant's "speech stirred people to anger, 
incited public dispute, or brought about a condition of un-
rest. "16 
To persons of ordinary understanding, the urging of 
others to acts of force or violence or to burn or destroy 
property, as proscribed by section 404.6, is neither similar 
nor comparable to speech which merely stirs to anger, 
invites public dispute, or brings about a condition of 
unrest. 16 
As long ago as 1939, in Cantwell v. Connecticut/7 and as 
recently as 1968, in Carroll v. President and Commissioners of 
Princess Anne,ts the court has asserted that freedom to speak 
does not sanction "incitement to riot,,19 and on that principle 
alone the statute should be constitutional. Although not dis-
cussed by the court, the statute seems even more limited than 
the Cantwell concept because the statute also requires the 
showing of intent on the part of the accused and evidence that 
at the time and place there existed circumstances which pro-
duced a clear, present, and immediate danger. 2o 
In another expression-related activity case, the court of 
appeal, fifth district, upheld a conviction under a trespass 
statute a refusal to leave a public building when it was regu-
larly closed to the pUblic. The case is Parrish v. Municipal 
13. 340 U.S. 315, 95 L.Ed. 295, 71 
S.C!. 303 (1951). 
14. 337 U.S. 1, 93 L.Ed. 1131, 69 
S.C!. 894 (1949). 
15. 337 U.S. at 5, 93 L.Ed. at 1135, 
69 S.C!. at 896. 
16. 68 Cal.2d at 485, 67 Cal. Rptr. 
at 549, 439 P.2d at 653. 
17. 310 U.S. 296, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 60 
S.Ct. 900. 128 A.L.R. 1352 (1939). 
264 CAL LAW 1969 
18. - U.S. -, 21 L.Ed.2d 325, 89 
S.C!. 347 (1968). 
19. - U.S. at -,21 L.Ed.2d at 331, 
89 S.C!. at 351. 
20. For a discussion of the part the 
intent of the speaker should play in de-
termining whether the speech should be 
prohibited see Note: Freedom of 
speech and assembly: The problem of 
the hostile audience, 49 Col. L. Rev. 
1118. 1123 (1949). 
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Court, Modesto Judicial District. 1 This was in line with the 
statement in Adderley v. Florida2 to the effect that "[n]othing 
in the Constitution of the United States prevents Florida from 
even-handed enforcement of its general trespass statute. 
"3 
Although this statute was upheld as against an attack that 
it was unconstitutionally vague under the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment,4 the writer is of the opinion 
that because it predicates violation upon "the surrounding 
circumstances . . . [being] such as to indicate to a reason-
able man that such person has no apparent lawful business to 
pursue,"5 the statute is vague and uncertain from the point of 
view of the individual who must determine whether or not he 
is in violation of it. In determining whether he is in violation 
if he stays in the building, he must determine whether a reason· 
able man (not himself) would determine whether he (the in-
dividual) has a lawful reason for being there. This is asking 
too much of any individual. 
Loyalty Oaths Must Be Narrowly Drawn 
Loyalty oaths, and in particular the oath required by Section 
3 of Article XX of the California Constitution, received 
judicial scrutiny during this past year in the case of Vogel v. 
County of Los Angeles.6 This oath requires public employees 
to swear that they will support and defend the United States 
and California Constitutions. It also requires the affiant to 
swear or affirm that he is not a member, nor within the past 
five years has he been a member, of any organization that 
advocates the overthrow of the government by force or vio-
lence, and that he will not advocate nor become a member of 
any such organization. 
1. 258 Cal. App.2d 497, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3. 385 U.S. at 47, 17 L.Ed.2d at 156, 
862 (1968). For further discussion of 87 S.Ct. at 247. 
this case, see Collings, CRIMINAL LAW 4. See In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App.2d 
AND PROCEDURE, in this volume. 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966). 
2. 385 U.S. 39, 17 L.Ed.2d 149, 87 5. Cal. Penal Code § 602(n). 
S.Ct. 242 (1966). 6. 68 Cal.2d 18, 64 Cal. Rptr. 409, 
434 P.2d 961 (1967). 
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In approaching the question the court noted that a similar 
oath was upheld by the California Supreme Court in 1952.7 
This was in accordance with the previous United States 
Supreme Court case of Adler v. Board of Education of the City 
of New York. B But said the California court: 
Subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 
however, have established constitutional doctrines not 
recognized in Adler, and the holding in that case has 
since been rejected by the United States Supreme Court. 
(Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 595, 87 
S Ct 675, 17 LEd 2d 629,636.)9 
In determining that the oath was unconstitutional, the court 
relied upon what are now generally accepted constitutional 
concepts: ( 1) that although there is no constitutional right 
to public employment, "the government may not condition 
public employment upon any terms that it may 
choose to impose. .;" (2) that when the government 
conditions public employment by limiting an individual's con-
stitutional rights, "it bears the heavy burden of demonstrating 
the practical necessity for the limitation . . .;" and (3) in 
the area of First Amendment freedoms such limitations "must 
be drawn with narrow specificity."lo 
In requiring narrow specificity, the Supreme Court has 
been concerned with the effect such statutes would have upon 
the First Amendment right of freedom of association. In 
Elfbrandt v. Russell,Il the court pointed out that: 
Those who join an organization but do not share its un-
lawful purposes and who do not participate in its un-
lawful activities surely pose no threat, either as citizens 
or as public employees.12 
7. Packman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 
676, 249 P.2d 267 (1952), app. dismd. 
345 U.S. 962, 97 L.Ed. 1381, 73 S.C!. 
951. 
8. 342 U.S. 485, 96 L.Ed. 517, 72 
S.C!. 380, 27 A.L.R.2d 472 (1952). 
9. 68 Cal.2d at 21, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 
411, 434 P.2d at 963. 
266 CAL LAW 1969 
10. 68 Cal.2d at 22, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 
411, 434 P.2d at 963. 
11. 384 U.s. 11, 16 L.Ed.2d 321, 86 
S.C!. 1238 (1966). 
12. 384 U.S. at 17, 16 L.Ed.2d at 
325, 86 S.ct. at 1241. 
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It follows that a law which applies to "membership without 
'specific intent' to further the illegal aims of the organization 
infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms. ,,13 
The California oath clearly violates this standard. This 
section of the Constitution "proscribes membership, past, 
present, or future, in any party or organization which advo-
cates the overthrow of the government by force, violence 
. . . and [t]here is no provision requiring a specific intent 
to further the unlawful aims of the organization.,,14 
Justice McComb's dissent in the Vogel case, to a great 
extent, is the adoption verbatim of most of the opinions in 
three prior cases: Steiner v. Derby,t5 Garner v. Board of 
Public Works/6 and Garner v. Board of Public Works.17 Jus-
tice McComb also quotes Justice Clark's dissenting opinion in 
Key ish ian v. Board of Regents of University of State of New 
York.ls 
After Elfbrandt and Key ish ian the California decisions in 
Steiner and Garner are of doubtful validity. As for the Su-
preme Court decision in Garner, one can argue that it too 
would not survive judicial scrutiny today. The approach used 
by the court in Elfbrandt if applied to Garner would have 
brought about a different result.19 
Justice McComb concluded his dissent with the following 
statement: 
In my opinion, the judiciary should not disregard the law 
as laid down by the citizens of California, directly or 
throught their representives in the state legislature. 2o 
One wonders what Justice McComb means by this state-
ment. Does he mean that when the people or the legislature 
13. 384 U.S. at 19, 17 L.Ed.2d at 17. 341 U.S. 716, 95 L.Ed. 1317,71 
326, 86 S.Ct. at 1242. S.Ct. 909 (1951). 
14. 68 Cal.2d at 24, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 18. 385 U.S. 589, 17 L.Ed.2d 629, 
413, 434 P.2d at 965. 87 S.Ct. 675 (1967). 
15. 88 Cal. App.2d 481, 199 P.2d 19. See Leahy, Loyalty and the first 
429 (1948), cert. dismd. 338 U.S. 327, amendment-A concept emerges, 43 N. 
94 L.Ed. 144, 70 S.Ct. 161. Dak. L. Rev. 53 (1966). 
16. 98 Cal. App.2d 493, 220 P.2d 20. 68 Cal.2d at 51, 64 Cal. Rptr at 
958 (1950), affd. 341 U.S. 716, 95 L.Ed. 430, 434 P.2d at 982. 
1317, 71 S.Ct. 909. 
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make laws the judiciary should never declare them uncon-
stitutional? Surely he can't mean that. The power of the 
judiciary to measure duly enacted laws against constitutional 
mandates was settled long ago in the case of Marbury v. 
Madison. l 
Use of Sound Amplification Devices May Be Limited 
Ordinances regulating the use of sound amplification devices 
are part and parcel of many municipal codes. One such ordi-
nance was before the court of appeal of the fifth district in the 
case of Chavez v. Municipal Court of Visalia Judicial District. 2 
The court in attacking the ordinance acknowledged that the 
public does not have unrestricted right to use public highways 
and that the county can make reasonable restrictions with re-
gard to such use. 
This ordinance, however, "presents great opportunity for 
discrimination, political preference and the type of censorship 
which is repugnant to the very concept upon which our free 
form of government is founded."s 
There is nothing unusual about this case. It follows prior 
Supreme Court doctrine with regard to conditioning First 
Amendment rights on the granting of permits. The court does 
point out, however, that another court of appeal, the fourth 
district, had held in a 1953 case4 that an almost identical 
ordinance was constitutional. 
The fifth district refused to follow the fourth district be-
cause "the paramount public interest wihch is inextricably 
connected with the subject matter of the ordinance has im-
pelled us to reconsider the question in light of conditions which 
have prevailed in this nation during more recent years."5 
The California Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal 
from the Chavez decision, two justices dissenting. In view 
of the fact that there undoubtedly are some sound device ordi-
1. 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 4. Haggerty v. County of Kings, 117 
2. 256 Cal. App.2d 149, 64 Cal. Cal. App.2d 470, 256 P.2d 393 (1953). 
Rptr. 76 (1967). 5. 256 Cal. App.2d at 157, 64 Cal. 
3. 256 Cal. App.2d at 157, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 82. 
Rptr. at 81. 
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nances similar to the one involved here still in effect in some 
municipalities, a resolution of the matter would have elimi-
nated the uncertainty that now exists as to whether a county 
may enforce a similarly drawn ordinance. 
Free Speech and Advertising on Public-Operated Motor 
Coaches 
Maya public transit district restrict the use of advertising 
space upon its motor coaches to commercial messages offering 
goods and services for sale? The California Supreme Court 
answered this unusual question in the negative in the case of 
Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District:6 
We conclude that defendants, having opened a forum 
for the expression of ideas by providing facilities for 
advertisements on its buses, cannot for reasons of admin-
istrative convenience decline to accept advertisements 
expressing opinions and beliefs within the ambit of First 
Amendment protection.7 
In reaching this conclusion the court equated advertising 
upon buses to the use of public buildings to hold public meet-
ings. In the case of Danskin v. San Diego Unified School 
District,S the court struck down a statute which granted the 
use of public facilities for meetings of organizations formed 
for education and related purposes but "prohibited the grant-
ing of the privilege to those who constitute a 'subversive ele-
ment,' as that term was broadly defined in the statute."g 
In Danskin the court could see the heavy hand of the censor 
denying the use of the facilities to those with whom the censor 
disagreed. The same kind of censorship, however, is not 
involved in the transit district's choice to accept only com-
mercially oriented advertisements or political ads at election 
time. The court recognized this but was of the opinion that 
6. 68 Cal.2d 51, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430. 8. 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 
434 P.2d 982 (1967). (1946). 
7. 68 Ca1.2d at 55, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 9. 68 Ca1.2d at 55, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 
433, 434 P.2d at 985. 433, 434 P.2d at 985. 
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the prohibition was painted with a broader brush than that 
condemned in Danskin. From this the court concluded that: 
The vice is not that the district has preferred one point 
of view over another, but that it chooses between classes 
of ideas entitled to constitutional protection, sanctioning 
the expression of only those selected, and banning all 
others. Thus the district's regulation exercises a most 
pervasive form of censorship.lO 
Just what the court referred to here is not clear, unless 
the court meant that there were three classes of ideas seeking 
public attention: (1) commercial ads; (2) political ads at 
election time; and (3) public opinion ads such as those plain-
tiffs offered.ll Because commercial ads are not entitled to 
constitutional protection, the phrase "chooses between classes 
of ideas entitled to constitutional protection" cannot mean 
those ads.12 The classes of ideas to which the court then 
referred must be those in classes 2 and 3. What the court 
said is that the district cannot make a choice between those 
two classifications because this is "a most pervasive form of 
censorship.,,13 The court did not rest its decision on this 
alone. After pointing out that commercial ads are not en-
titled to First Amendment protection, the court noted that 
in this case the district had chosen to give such messages pref-
erence over nonmercantile ads. This, too, is censorship ac-
cording to Justice Black's concurring opinion in Cox v. Lou-
isiana,14 wherein he asserted that a statute which prohibited 
"obstruction of public passageways," but did not apply to 
10. 68 Cal.2d at 56, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
at 434, 434 P.2d at 986. 
11. The ad which the plaintiffs de-
sired to display on the buses read as 
follows: "'Mankind must put an end 
to war or war will put an end to man-
kind.' President John F. Kennedy. 
Write to President Johnson: Negotiate 
Vietnam. 
Women for Peace 
P. O. Box 944, Berkeley." 
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12. Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 
U.S. 52, 86 L.Ed. 1262, 62 S.Ct. 920 
(1942). 
13. 68 Cal.2d at 56, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 
434, 434 P.2d at 986. 
14. 379 U.S. 536, 13 L.Ed.2d 471, 
85 S.Ct. 453 (1965). 
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labor organizational activity was "censorship in a most odious 
form . . . ."15 
While one may agree that this is in effect a form of censor-
ship, there is not in it the same evil as in Danskin. There the 
school had the power to choose between conflicting view-
points on religious, political, social, and economic matters. 
It had the power to promote those views with which it agreed 
and to deter those with which it did not. The district in 
W irta is not making that kind of choice. During election time 
it does just the opposite. It seeks out the opposing candidates 
and proponents and opponents of ballot propositions and 
offers advertising space to them. The district argued that 
this was really an equal protection question and that its regula-
tion was valid because its classification of ads rests upon a 
rational basis. The court did not accept this argument because 
it could not find any societal interest which would be en-
hanced by the classification. 
Despite efforts of the district to articulate a rationale for 
its policy, if there is a societal interest, other than free 
speech, requiring protection here, it is too obscure or 
trival to be readily apparent. 16 
The court then went on to point out that the test of reason-
ableness which is applicable to due process and equal protec-
tion is not a test used to determine whether governmental 
action infringes upon First Amendment rights. The test in 
cases such as this is the clear and present danger test and 
there was no clear and present danger here. 
Wirta is a difficult case. At the outset it is agreed that the 
district need not have offered any of its space for advertising. 
Until it did so there could be no claim of infringement upon 
constitutional rights. When it did open its space to certain 
classes of ads, did this give rise to a First Amendment right 
in the plaintiffs? The majority said that it did, whereas three 
dissenting Justices, Burke, McComb and Schauer, disagreed. 
Once one crosses the threshold of giving the plaintiffs a 
15. 379 U.S. at 581, 13 L.Ed.2d at 16. 68 Cal.2d at 59-60, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
502, 85 S.Ct. at 470. at 436, 434 P.2d at 988. 
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First Amendment right to use such space the regulation ap-
pears clearly unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional under 
the clear and present danger test because as the court noted, 
there is no clear and present danger of the occurrence of 
any substantive evil by the acceptance of such ads. I7 A bal-
ancing test does not save the regulation either because here 
again, whatever societal interest there may be in not accepting 
such ads, it is obscure in this case. IS Assuming that the 
district can make some regulations with regard to the ads it 
accepts as to size and shape, etc., the present regulation would 
also fall because of overbreadth. It bans all public opinion 
ads and thus absolutely annuls the First Amendment right 
which the majority held arose when the district opened its 
space for advertising. I9 
Anonymity and the Recorded Telephone Message 
That anonymity plays a part in the protection of constitu-
tional rights is now well established. The United States 
Supreme Court has held that anonymity of affiliation is in-
dispensible to the protection of freedom of association.20 In 
Talley v. California/ the court held that freedom of speech 
also included the right to remain anonymous while exercising 
that right. 
In the case of Huntley v. Public Utilities Commission,2 the 
court was called upon to determine whether the right to remain 
anonymous was applicable to recorded telephone messages. 
At issue was a regulation of Pacific Telephone and Telegraph 
Company which required all subscribers to its recorded an-
17. Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494, 95 L.Ed. 1137,71 S.C!. 857 
(1951); Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. at 47, 63 L.Ed. 470, 39 S.Ct. 247 
(1919). 
18. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 
366 U.S. 36, 6 L.Ed.2d 105, 81 S.C!. 
997 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 
360 U. S. 109,3 L.Ed.2d 1115, 79 S.C!. 
1081 (1959). 
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19. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 
88, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940). 
20. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 
U.S. 516, 4 L.Ed.2d 480, 80 S.Ct. 412 
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 
449, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 78 S.Ct. 1163 
(1958). 
1. 362 U.S. 60, 4 L.Ed.2d 559, 80 
S.Ct. 536 (1960). 
2. 69 Cal.2d 67, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605. 
442 P.2d 685 (1968). 
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nouncement service to include in their recorded messages 
their names and addresses. Huntley subscribed to this service, 
under the slogan "Let Freedom Ring," to air his views on 
certain political matters. Because he did not wish to give 
his name or address, he sought a review of an order of the 
Public Utilities Commission which had approved the Pacific 
Telephone regulation. 
In striking down the regulation as a violation of freedom 
of speech, the court discussed such cases as NAACP v. Ala-
bama3 and Bates v. City of Little Rock,4 wherein the Supreme 
Court had struck down state attempts to force disclosure of 
membership in the NAACP. The court used a balancing test 
in those cases, balancing the infringement upon free association 
against an alleged interest of the government in requiring dis-
closure of such membership. 
The California Supreme Court also likened Huntley to 
Talley, supra, a case wherein the United States Supreme Court 
had struck down an ordinance which prohibited distribution 
of handbills that did not contain the name and address of 
the person producing or distributing it. Talley, and the line 
of cases it follows,5 are not balancing cases. The Talley 
opinion is written by Justice Black, who is no friend of bal-
ancing.6 While Justice Black cites with approval NAACP 
and Bates, it appears that his real attack on the ordinance in 
Talley is that it is too broad: 
Counsel has urged that this ordinance is aimed at provid-
ing a way to identify those responsible for fraud, false 
advertising and libel. Yet the ordinance is in no manner 
so limited, nor have we been referred to any legislative 
history indicating such a purpose. Therefore we do not 
3. 357 U.S. 449, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 78 
S.Ct. 1163 (1958). 
4. 361 U.S. 516, 4 L.Ed.2d 480, 80 
S.Ct. 412 (1960). 
5. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 
84 L.Ed. 155, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939); 
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 83 L.Ed. 
18 
1423, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939); Lovell v. 
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 82 L.Ed. 
949, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1939). 
6. See Justice Black's dissent in Kon-
igsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 
at 56, 6 L.Ed.2d at 120, 81 S.Ct. at 
1010 (1961). 
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pass on the validity of an ordinance limited to prevent 
these or any other supposed evils.7 
Huntley is a mixture of balancing and overbreadth. The 
court did not find a "compelling state interest" which would 
tip the scales in favor of the regulation. Even if there were 
interests that need protection, such as an indication that the 
message is not sponsored by Pacific Telephone, such a dis-
claimer could have been required without identifying the 
actual sponsor of the message. 
It appears to the writer that the balancing test does not 
adequately protect the anonymity that is necessary for the 
exercise of free expression in cases such as this. Balancing 
can result in requiring full disclosure which to some people 
might be a complete deterrent.8 Approaching the problem 
from the viewpoint that a narrowly drawn regulation might 
be permissible would require the maker of the regulation to 
seek out ways to accommodate the public interest without 
deterring potential speakers. If it were impossible to draft 
the regulation without it having such a deterring eifect, the 
regulation should not be allowed to stand unless there is a 
clear and present danger that the anonymous speech would 
result in a substantive evil which the government has a right 
to prevent.9 
Speech Versus Unobstructed Justice 
The exercise of one's right to free speech clashed with 
the public's interest in having unobstructed justice in the case 
of Crosswhite v. Municipal Court of Eureka Judicial District.lO 
Just prior to the trial of two individuals for violating a "bed 
tax" ordinance, Crosswhite placed ads in local newspapers 
calling attention to the case and asking why the city had to 
have such a tax when many cities in California did not. 
7. 362 U.S. at 64, 4 L.Ed.2d at 562, 
80 S.Ct. at 538. 
8. See Canon v. Justice Court, 61 
Cal.2d 446, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228, 393 
P.2d 428 (1964). 
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9. See: Comment: The constitutional 
right to anonymity: Free speech, dis-
closure and the devil, 70 Yale L. Jour. 
1084, 112R (1961). 
10. 260 Cal. App.2d 428, 67 Cal. 
Rptr 216 (1968). 
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When the ads were brought to the attention of the court, 
it postponed the trial and commenced contempt proceedings 
against Crosswhite. After finding that the ads constituted a 
clear and present danger to the administration of justice, the 
court found him guilty. A petition for a writ of review to 
the superior court was denied and an appeal to the court of 
appeal, first district, was taken. That court reversed and 
sent the case back to the superior court for review. In so 
doing the court reviewed the Supreme Court cases which 
have touched upon the question and concluded correctly that 
the test that should apply is whether there was a clear and 
present danger to the administration of justice by the exercise 
of the right of free speech. Although the court sent the case 
back to the superior court to resolve the issue, it is clear that 
the appellate court did not believe that there was a clear and 
present danger of any substantive evil in this case. 
Freedom of the Press and the Licensing of Newspapers 
The application of a business license tax to a newspaper 
published by a political party was before the court of appeal, 
fourth district, in the case of Long v. City of Anaheim.l1 The 
newspaper in question was published by the Socialist Labor 
Party and was used to promote nominees of the party and to 
disseminate the party's political philosophy. It carried no 
commercial advertising but was sold on newsstands for five 
cents a copy. Not being successful in securing an exemption 
from the license taxes of the cities of Anaheim and Garden 
Grove, the petitioners brought an action to enjoin those cities 
from requiring the payment of the tax. The Anaheim ordi-
nance contained an exemption for charitable and non-profit 
organizations, while the Garden Grove ordinance defined 
"business" that was subject to the tax as one "carried on for 
profit or lifelihood [sic]. "12 
Upon examining the facts, the court found that the paper 
in question had always operated at a loss and that the limited 
amount of revenue obtained by the sale of the paper only 
11. 255 Cal. App.2d 191, 63 Cal. 12. 255 Cal. App.2d at 196, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 56 (1967). Rptr. at 59. 
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reduced the annual deficit. Further, the court noted that in 
the case of Murdock v. Commissioner of Pennsylvania13 the 
Supreme Court had held that selling religious literature did 
not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise. 
In the instant case, "the primary function of the 'Weekly 
People' is to present the views of the Socialist Party to the 
paper's subscribers and not to realize a pecuniary profit.,,14 
On this basis the court held that the paper was "a noncom-
mercial nonprofit, purely political publication, and that under 
any reasonable interpretation of the . . . ordinances, the 
publication (is) exempt from the payment of the 
business license fee. ,,15 The court stated that if the paper 
was not entitled to the exemption the ordinances would prob-
ably be unconstitutional because "[iJf the guarantees of free-
dom of speech and freedom of the press are to be preserved, 
municipalities should not be free to raise general revenue by 
taxes on the circulation of information and opinion in non-
commercial causes. . . . "16 
Freedom of the Press and the Distribution of a Newspaper 
The city of Pacific Grove, California, has an ordinance 
that prohibits the throwing of newspapers or other printed 
matter on any residential property without the consent of 
the owner. In the case of Di Lorenzo v. City of Pacific 
Grove/7 the publisher of a local newspaper sought to enjoin 
the enforcement of this ordinance, claiming that it violated 
her First Amendment right of freedom of the press. Recog-
nizing that the right of freedom of the press includes protection 
for the means of dissemination, the court held that "the proper 
test of regulation in this area turns upon whether 
the regulation is a reasonable and necessary one. ,,18 
13. 319 U.S. 105, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 63 17. 260 Cal. App.2d 68, 67 Cal. Rptr. 
S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R. 81 (1943). 3 (1968). For further discussion of this 
14. 255 Cal. App.2d at 198-199, 63 case, see McKinstry, STATE AND LOCAL 
Cal. Rptr. at 61. GOVERNMENT. 
15. 255 Cal. App.2d at 199, 63 Cal. 18. 260 Cal. App.2d at 71, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. at 61. Rptr. at 5. 
16. 255 Cal. App.2d at 200, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. at 62. 
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Finding that the ordinance was reasonable and narrowly 
drawn, the court held that it was constitutional. 
If one considers that what is being regulated is the means 
of effectively pursuing one's rights, in this case freedom of 
the press, the court's use of the test of reasonableness appears 
to be valid. The Supreme Court itself has not only upheld 
"reasonable" regulations aimed at the means of exercising a 
rightI9 but has upheld reasonable regulations upon the exercise 
of the right itself.20 Even in those cases where the court has 
struck down a regulation as a violation of a right, it has 
declared that some reasonable regulation of the right is accept-
able. 1 
Pandering Is Not Part of Obscenity Definition in Cali-
fornia 
The definition of obscenity and its application to a specific 
publication was before the California Supreme Court in People 
v. NorofJ.2 The defendants were charged with possession of 
obscene matter for distribution in this state. The issue was 
whether the magazine in question was obscene per se under 
the statutory definition.3 The court held that it was not. 
The case is noteworthy in that the state argued that the 
trial court should have permitted the jury to hear evidence 
bearing upon defendant's "pandering" of the magazine. The 
19. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 
341 U.S. 622, 95 L.Ed. 1233, 71 S.Ct. 
920, 35 A.L.R.2d 335 (1951); Kovacs 
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 93 L.Ed. 513, 
69 S.Ct. 448, 10 A.L.R.2d 608 (1949). 
20. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 
U.S. 395, 97 L.Ed. 1105, 73 S.Ct. 760, 
30 A.L.R.2d 987 (1953); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 88 L.Ed. 
645, 64 S.Ct. 438 (1944); Cox v. New 
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 85 L.Ed. 
1049, 61 S.Ct. 762, 133 A.L.R. 1396 
(1941). 
1. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 
U.S. 141, 87 L.Ed. 1313, 63 S.Ct. 862 
(1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 
U.S. 444, 82 L.Ed. 949, 58 S.Ct. 666 
(1939). 
2. 67 Cal.2d 791, 63 Cal. Aptr. 575, 
433 P.2d 479 (1967). 
3. Cal. Penal Code § 311 (a) reads as 
follows: 
"Obscene" means that to the aver-
age person, applying contemporary 
standards, the predominant appeal of 
the matter, taken as a whole, is to 
prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or 
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or ex-
cretion, which goes substantially beyond 
customary limits of candor in descrip-
tion or representation of such matters 
and is matter which is utterly without 
redeeming social importance, 
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court's answer was that the indictment did not charge the 
defendant with pandering and even if it had, pandering is 
not a crime in California.4 
In discussing the matter of pandering the court disapproved 
of some statements made in Landau v. Fording. 5 In that 
case the court of appeal had referred to, the fact that the 
movie in question had earned substantial sums of money from 
its exhibition and that fact bolstered its conclusion that the 
movie was obscene. As a basis for this it used the rationale 
of Ginzburg v. United States,6 wherein the Supreme Court 
held that evidence of pandering may be used to determine 
whether the material in question is obscene. 
The trial court in the N oroff case seemed to be of the opin-
ion that the Landau decision added the pandering factor to 
the California definition, but the court of appeal rejected this 
VIew. 
Ordinance Licensing Theaters Must Contain Precise 
Standards 
Section 103.109 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code pro-
vides that no person shall engage in the business of exhibiting 
motion picture films without a written permit from the board 
of police commissioners. The Code also provides that the 
board shall not issue a license if the operation of the theater 
will not comport with the peace, health, safety, convenience, 
good morals, and general welfare of the public; or if the 
business has been or is a public nuisance; or if the applicant 
is unfit to be trusted with the privileges granted by such 
permit, or has a bad moral character, intemperate habits or 
bad reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity. 
In Burton v. Municipal Court defendants, charged with the 
4. Pandering is the business of pur- See discussion of this case Cal Law 
veying sexual matter openly advertised Trends and Developments 1967, pages 
to appeal to the erotic interest of the 346-349. 
customer. 6. 383 U.S. 463, 16 L.Ed.2d 31, 86 
5. 245 Cal. App.2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr. S.Ct. 942 (1966). 
177 (1966), aff'd mem., 388 U.S. 456, 7. 68 Cal.2d. 684,68 Cal. Rptr. 721, 
18 L.Ed.2d 1317, 87 S.Ct. 2109 (1967). 441 P.2d 281 (1968). 
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violation of the ordinance, sought a declaration that these 
sections of the Code were unconstitutional under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the petitioners ar-
gued that the requirement of a license infringed upon their 
right of free expression, the court had little difficulty disposing 
of that question: 
No credible authority supports an exemption for motion 
picture theaters from the requirement of obtaining a 
license pursuant to a city's police power to regulate 
theaters, and a substantial number of decisions have 
upheld such authority and the exaction of a license fee. s 
The next question that the court had to answer was more 
difficult: Did the standards by which the board was to act 
violate any constitutional requirement? The court's answer 
was in the affirmative. The Code did "not provide precise 
standards capable of objective measurement-the sensitive 
tools to be employed whenever First Amendment rights are 
involved."9 The court equated the exhibition of motion pic-
tures with the exercise of such First Amendment rights as 
solicitation and the distribution of non-commercial printed 
material. Statutes licensing these activities have been held 
unconstitutional where the laws give the licensing authority 
discretionary power under vague standards governing the issu-
ing of the license. 
It is this equation that makes this an unusual case. What 
the court said is that when a license is required to engage 
in a business that embodies the exercise of a constitutional 
right, the licensing statute must be narrowly drawn. This is 
so because "overly broad standards are fraught with the hazard 
that an applicant will be denied his rights to free speech and 
press through exercise of the power of the board, in its dis-
cretion, to refuse a permit because of the content of the films 
which the applicant exhibits in his theater. "10 
8. 68 Cal.2d at 689, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 9. 68 Cal.2d at 692, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
724, 441 P.2d at 284. See also AMusE- at 726, 441 P.2d at 286. 
MENTS AND EXHIBITIONS, 4 Am. JUf.2d 10. 68 Cal.2d at 692, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
150. at 726, 441 P.2d at 286. 
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One can agree with the court that such overly broad stand-
ards do give a board a great deal of discretionary control over 
theater operators. However, among the standards which the 
court found overly broad was the standard that the applicant 
have "good moral character," stating "[fJor example, the board 
may consider that an applicant who has exhibited films offen-
sive to the sensibilities of the board members does not have 
'good moral character'. ."11 The court was concerned 
that the board could use this standard and the others to 
impose a censorship or previous restraint upon the exercise 
of the applicant's First Amendment right to freedom of expres-
sion. "Good moral character," however, is the basic stand-
ard for testing the qualifications of applicants for a great 
variety of occupations. For example, in California one who 
wishes to practice cosmetology or barbering must have "good 
moral character and temperate habits."12 Dentists, pharma-
cists, engineers, physicians, and attorneys must all possess 
"good moral character. ,,13 
To engage in an occupation or profession of one's choice 
is a constitutional right. In Stewart v. County of San Mated4 
the court of appeal, first district, stated: 
[W]e note first that it is firmly established that the 
right of every person to engage in a legitimate employ-
ment, business or vocation is an individual freedom se-
cured by the due process provision of the federal and 
state Constitutions.15 
And in the recent case of Hallinan v. Committee of Bar 
Examiners of the State Bar/6 the supreme court affirmed that 
there is a constitutional right to practice law.17 If "good moral 
11. 68 Cal.2d at 692, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
at 726, 441 P.2d at 286. 
12. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 7362.1 
and 6545. 
13. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 1628, 
Dentists; § 4089, Pharmacists; § 6751, 
Engineering; § 2168, Physicians; and 
§ 6060, Attorneys. Funeral directors 
and embalmers need only have good 
character. See §§ 7619 and 7643. 
280 CAL LAW 1969 
14. 246 Cal. App.2d 273, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 599 (1966). 
15. 246 Cal. App.2d at 284-285, 54 
Cal. Rptr. at 606. 
16. 65 Cal.2d 447, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 
421 P.2d 76 (1966). 
17. Concerning the part that "good 
moral character" plays in admission to 
the Bar see March v. Committee of Bar 
Examiners, 67 Cal.2d 718, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
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character" is a standard which can be used as a weapon 
to deny the licensing of a theater, it would seem that it would 
have the same inherent danger as a standard to judge qualifi-
cations of applicants for licenses to engage in any occupation 
or profession. 
The Right to Remain Silent and Freedom of Speech 
A novel application of freedom of speech was asserted by 
the petitioner in the case of Fallis v. Department of Motor 
Vehicles. IS The case arose when the petitioner sought a 
writ of mandamus to the Department of Motor Vehicles to set 
aside its order suspending his driver's license and asserted, 
among other things, that freedom of speech included a right 
to remain silent. The Department of Motor Vehicles has 
the power to suspend a driver's license for refusal to take a 
chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of the li-
censee's blood, under section 13353 of the Vehicle Code. In 
contesting the validity of the suspension of his license, the 
licensee contended that requiring him to give an answer to 
the request to take the test, such as saying "no," was a violation 
of his right of freedom of speech because that right includes 
a right not to communicate at all. 19 
The court answered that "it may be argued that freedom 
of speech implies the right not to speak under compulsion: 
(a) not to be compelled to utter an opinion in a certain tenor, 
but also (b) not to be compelled to make any utterance of 
any kind.,,20 It found some support for the first proposition 
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette l but 
could find none for the second proposition and thus concluded 
399, 433 P.2d 191 (1967) and Hallinan 
v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 
Cal.2d 447, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 
76 (1966). 
18. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
595 (1968). For further discussion of 
this case, see Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW, in this volume. 
19. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 
U.S. 478, 12 L.Ed.2d 977,84 S.Ct. 1758 
(1964) wherein the Supreme Court de-
clared that there is an absolute right 
to remain silent based upon the privi-
lege against self-incrimination of the 
Fifth Amendment. This, of course, re-
lates to criminal matters. 
20. 264 Cal. App.2d at -, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. at 600. 
1. 319 U.S. 624, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 63 
S.Ct. 1178, 147 A.L.R. 674 (1943). 
CAL LAW 1969 281 
27
Leahy: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Constitutional Law 
that there was no First Amendment violation in the enforce-
ment of Section 13353. 
Public Employment and Constitutional Rights 
Public employment versus the exercise of one's right to 
freedom of religion became the basis of the case of Hollon v. 
Pierce. 2 Hollon was a school bus driver. Just before his 
annual contract was to be renewed the district trustees were 
informed that he was a sponsor of a religious tract containing 
unorthodox religious views and violent denunciations of cer-
tain Christian denominations. The authorities became con-
cerned about Hollon's emotional stability and fitness to drive 
a school bus. In reviewing his file it was found to contain 
some references to emotional outbursts over the happening 
of certain events which he disliked. After Hollon refused an 
offer to appear before them, and after considering the finding 
of two psychiatrists that he was not maladjusted, disoriented, 
psychotic or dangerous, the trustees refused to renew his con-
tract. 
The court of appeal, third district, in sustaining a superior 
court denial of reinstatement, found that the trustees had acted 
in good faith in not renewing Hollon's contract because of 
their determination that he did not have the emotional stability 
required of a school bus driver: 
Irrationality takes many outward forms. Mental aber-
rations just as readily assume a religious guise as not. 
That an aberration is expressed in religious terms does 
not foreclose good faith inquiry into the aberration itself. 
Such an inquiry by those responsible for the employee's 
fitness is not an invasion of his private religious beliefs.3 
This case appears to be in accordance with Supreme Court 
doctrine in matters involving the relationship between the 
government and its employees where the question of fitness 
is concerned. 
2. 257 Cal. App.2d 468, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3. 257 Cal. App.2d at 477, 64 Cal. 
808 (1968). For further discussion of Rptr. at 814. 
this case, see Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW, in this volume. 
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In Shelton v. Tucker4 the court held that a state certainly 
had a right to investigate the competence and fitness of those 
it employs as teachers. The same, of course, should apply 
to any other public employee. 
Although the court of appeal cites with approval the case 
of Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District,5 wherein 
the supreme court enunciated a test to be used in judging 
governmental restrictions on its employees in the exercise of 
their constitutional rights, the Hollon case is not in the same 
class. In this latter case the basic issue was whether the 
trustees acted within the concept of due process in determining 
Hollon's fitness to continue as a school bus driver. The Bagley 
standard does not really fit this kind of an inquiry. The Bag-
ley standard is more applicable to a situation where the 
employee desires to exercise a constitutional right and the 
government concludes that the public interest requires the 
subordination of that right.s 
Fitness for public employment and the exercise of a con-
stitutional right were also before the court of appeal, first 
district, in the case of Hofberg v. County of Los Angeles 
Civil Service Commission.7 In that case the petitioner in 
applying for county employment stated that if he were ever 
called before the House Un-American Activities Committee 
he would refuse, on advice of counsel and on Fifth Amend-
ment grounds, to answer questions concerning so-called sub-
versive activities of the kind required to be answered by Sec-
tion 1028.1 of the California Government Code. He did agree 
to answer questions before any other U. S. Congressional Com-
mittee or before the county, or any state, employing agency.s 
On the basis of the information supplied by the petitioner 
4. 364 U.S. 479, 5 L.Ed.2d 231, 81 
S.Ct. 247 (1960). 
5. 65 Cal.2d 499, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 
421 P.2d 409 (1966). 
6. For an exhaustive discussion of 
Bagley v. Washington Township see 
Cal Law Trends and Developments 
1967, Constitutional Law. 
7. 258 Cal. App.2d 433, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 759 (1968). For further discus-
sion of this case, see Manuel, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW, in this volume. 
S. Petitioner was a former employee 
of Los Angeles County but had been 
discharged in 1957 because he had as-
serted his Fifth Amendment privilege 
before HUAC the year before. 
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and without any type of a hearing on the issue, the county 
refused to place his name on the eligibility list. He then 
sought a writ of mandate, to compel the county to place him 
on the eligibility list. 
In affirming the decision of the superior court which granted 
the writ of mandate, the court reviewed the course which the 
Supreme Court cases have taken since the early 1950's. Two 
concepts run through these cases. In a number of cases the 
court has upheld the right of the government to make inquiry 
into the loyalty of its employees, concluding that the failure 
of the employee to supply such information relates to his fit-
ness and reliability.9 The court has also held, however, that 
an employee cannot be discharged just because he invokes the 
privilege against self-incrimination.lO If the employee is to 
be discharged following the taking of the privilege it must 
be for reasons other than his invoking the privilege. The 
reasons must relate to his fitness and must be determined by 
holding a hearing on the matter. 
The instant case does not fall within either of these con-
cepts. In this case, while the petitioner has indicated he 
will refuse to answer certain questions if ever again called 
before HUAC, he has volunteered to answer any and all ques-
tions put to him by any other county or state agency. The 
court stated: "All information relevant to loyalty and sub-
versive activities, bearing on Hofberg's fitness as a county 
employee, can be obtained by the Commission's merely asking 
responden t. ,m 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Claimed, But Not Sustained 
Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court wrote 
in Railway Express Agency v. New York, "While claims 
of denial of equal protection are frequently asserted, they are 
9. Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 Education, 350 U.S. 551, 100 L.Ed. 
U.S. 399, 2 L.Ed.2d 1414, 78 S.Ct. 1317 692, 76 S.Ct. 637 (1956). 
(1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 11. 258 Cal. App.2d at 441, 65 Cal. 
2 L.Ed.2d 1423, 78 S.Ct. 1311 (1958). Rptr. at 765. 
10. Slochower v. Board of Higher 
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rarely sustained."12 This statement applies to the sixteen 
cases in which the equal protection issue was raised in the 
appellate courts in California this past year.' In none of 
these cases was the appeal to this part of the Four-
teenth Amendment successful. What makes the invocation 
of this constitutional right generally unsuccessful is the criteria 
by which alleged unequal treatment is judged: 
In . . . cases, involving distinctions not drawn ac-
cording to race, the Court has merely asked whether there 
is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and 
has deferred to the wisdom of state legislatures. IS 
This almost total submission to the wisdom of the legislature 
lends weight to another statement Justice Jackson made in 
Railway Express Agency: 
The equal protection clause ceases to assure either equal-
ity or protection if it is avoided by any conceivable 
difference that can be pointed out between those bound 
and those left free. 14 
A review of just a few of the cases will illustrate the appli-
cation of the equal protection clause by the California appel· 
late courts this past year. 
Different tax treatment with regard to income earned in a 
foreign country as compared to income earned in another state 
was approved in Tetreault v. Franchise Tax Board. 15 In this 
case the taxpayer earned income in Japan which was subject 
to income tax there. The Franchise Tax Board disallowed the 
tax paid to Japan in computing the taxpayer's California 
income tax. In answer to the taxpayer's argument that this 
denied him equal protection, the court quoted from the case 
of Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers/6 to the effect that 
while the equal protection clause does apply to state taxation, 
12. 336 U.S. 106, 111,93 L.Ed. 533, 
539, 69 S.Ct. 463 (1949). 
13. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
at 9, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 at 1016, 87 S.Ct. 
1817 at 1822 (1967). 
14. 336 U.S. at 115, 93 L.Ed. at 541, 
69 S.Ct. at 468. 
15. 255 Cal. App.2d 277, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 326 (1967). 
16. 358 U.S. 522, 3 L.Ed.2d 480, 79 
S.Ct. 437 (1959). 
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there is no iron rule of equality and the states therefore have 
broad power to fashion their tax schemes. 
The California judicial system came under an equal protec-
tion attack in Whittaker v. Superior Court.I7 The issue before 
the court was whether there was a denial of equal protection 
in the state appellate procedure whereby in some counties 
an appeal from a justice court was heard by a single judge 
of the superior court, whereas in other counties such an appeal 
would be heard by a three-judge panel of the superior court. 
Section 77 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for an 
appellate department of the superior court only in counties 
having municipal courts. The court of appeal, third district, 
had concluded that Section 77 was a violation of the equal 
protection clause and therefore void. Because of the impact 
this would have had upon the appellate system, the Supreme 
Court, on its own motion, had the matter transferred to it 
for final decision. 
After reviewing the judicial system in California and noting 
that the appellate procedures are significantly different in 
various geographical areas of the state, the court held that 
such differences are founded upon a reasonable classification 
by the legislature and thus do not offend the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The test used was the one enunciated by the 
Supreme Court, as set forth above: Does the classification 
here in question bear a substantial and reasonable relationship 
to a legitimate legislative objective? 
Answering the question in the affirmative, the court noted 
that while the existence of an appellate department of a supe-
rior court is determined by the existence of a municipal court 
in the county, the determination is based on population and 
geography and such classification is rational because rural 
counties produce relatively few appeals and the cost of a mul-
tiple-judge court in those counties would be substantial. 
The validity of a classification after the fact was the issue 
before the Supreme Court in the case of City of Los Angeles 
v. Standard Oil Co. of California. Is 
17. 68 Cal.2d 357, 66 Cal. Rptr. 710, 18. 262 Cal. App.2d 118, 68 Cal. 
438 P.2d 358 (1968). Rptr. 512 (1968). 
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After a dam had broken because of oil drilling operations 
near it, the state legislature enacted a statute which changed 
the law with regard to contribution among tortfeasors so that 
it did not apply to the liability growing out of the bursting 
of the dam. Under Section 875 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, the right of contribution does not arise until one tort-
feasor has paid the judgment. The new law, designated AB9, 
gives rise to contribution among tortfeasors "when one tort-
feasor has discharged by payment the common liability ... 
although judgment has not been rendered against all or any 
of them in an action on the tort."19 
In replying to the contention that AB9 violates constitu-
tional guarantees against special and arbitrary legislation, the 
court relied upon the usual test that the legislature has wide 
discretion in making classifications and that such classifications 
will not be struck down unless arbitrary or unreasonable. In 
this case the court found that the need to get relief to the 
injured property owners as soon as possible justified the legis-
lature in changing the law to meet this urgent situation. 
A female holding an on-sale liquor license and the wife 
of any male holder of such a license may act as a barmaid but 
other females may not under Section 25656 of the Business and 
Professions Code. This classification was upheld in Hargens 
v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board.20 
Forbidding some female employees to mix drinks while 
others are permitted to do so is a reasonable legislative classi-
fication, the court held, and therefore does not violate the 
equal protection clause. The court believed that because the 
state could control two of the classifications, that is, female 
holders of licenses and wives of holders of licenses, by its 
power to suspend the license, the state could then control 
improper conduct by such females. The state, however, would 
not have such control over a female who was merely an em-
ployee. This made the classification a reasonable one. 
19. 262 Cal. App.2d at 122, 68 Cal. 20. 263 Cal. App.2d 601, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. at 514. Rptr. 868 (1968). 
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Congressional Redistricting Approved 
In Silver v. Reagan! the California Supreme Court refused 
to defer redistricting of the state's Congressional districts 
until after the 1970 census. The court was of the opinion 
that even though there had been a substantial increase in 
population since the 1960 census, reapportionment at this 
time would be less inequitable than allowing the then existing 
inequitable districts to remain for another two years. 
The court gave the legislature until November 10, 1967, 
to submit to it a redistricting plan with the proviso that if the 
legislature did not do so the court would order into effect a 
plan the court deemed appropriate. The legislature did re-
district and what is now Section 30000 of the Elections Code 
was submitted to the court and approved by it in Silver v. 
Reagan.2 This redistricting was then used as a basis for the 
primary and general elections of 1968. 
Due Process and the Wearing of a Beard 
In 1966 the Supreme Court of California, in Bagley v. 
Washington Township Hospital District,3 set forth a three-
part test to be used by the court to test governmental restriction 
upon the exercise of constitutional rights. In commenting 
upon the Bagley standard this writer stated: 
The standard adopted in Bagley appears to be a work-
able formula. Any such standard should weigh heavily 
in favor of the individual, and his rights should be con-
sidered absolute insofar as possible to do SO.4 
The case of Akin v. Riverside Unified School District Board 
of Education5 is another illustration of the application of the 
Bagley test. That case involved the question of the suspension 
of a high school student for wearing a beard in violation of 
_1. 67 Cal.2d 452, 62 Cal. Rptr. 424, 4. See Cal Law Trends and Develop-
432 P.2d 26 (1967). !nellis 1967, page 341. 
2. 67 Cal.2d 924, 64 Cal. Rptr. 325, 5. 262 Cal. App.2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
434 P.2d 621 (1967). 557 (1968). For further discussion of 
3. 65 Cal.2d 499, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, this case, see McKinstry, STATE AND 
421 P.2d 409 (1966). LOCAL GOVERNMENT, in this volume. 
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the school's "good grooming policy." Starting from a position 
that the student had a constitutional right to wear a beard, 
the court applied the Bagley standard and inquired: 
(1) (W) hether the restraint imposed on the male stu-
dents' freedom to grow a beard, . . . rationally and 
reasonably relates to the enhancement of a free public 
education; (2) whether the benefits which the public 
gains by the restraint prohibiting a beard outweigh the 
resulting impairment of the students' right to grow a 
beard; and (3) whether any alternative less subversive 
of the students' constitutional right is available.6 
The court then reviewed the record and concluded that there 
was evidence that wearing beards by students was disruptive; 
that there was a benefit to the public to have the schools 
operate with a minimum of interruption; and that there ap-
peared to be no alternative less subversive to the student's 
right to grow a beard. 
The burden was upon the school board to meet the standard 
to the satisfaction of the court. Only by meeting the standard 
could the school restrict the student's constitutional right. In 
this case the student also argued that "[t]he board's ruling 
has the effect of extending into petitioner's home life thereby 
violating his right of privacy."7 The court resolved this 
question by quoting from Leonard v. School Committee of 
Attlebor08 in which the Massachusetts court apparently merely 
balanced the right against the interest of the other students, 
the teachers, and the public and concluded that the latter's 
interests were superior. The Bagley standard would appear to 
be applicable to the constitutional right of privacy as well as 
to the constitutional right of liberty of which wearing a beard 
is part, and would give greater protection to that right than 
a mere balancing test. 
6. 262 Cal. App.2d at 167-168, 68 7. 262 Cal. App.2d at 169, 68 Cal. 
Cal. Rptr. at 562. (This is the Bagley Rptr. at 563. 
standard worded to reflect the precise 8. 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468, 
questions at issue.) 14 A.L.R.3d 1192 (1965). 
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Due Process: Suspend License First-Listen Later 
A compelling public interest supported the summary sus-
pension of a license to operate a school for training guide 
dogs for the blind in Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of 
Guide Dogs.9 The constitutionality of Section 7214 of the 
Business and Professions Code, which requires automatic sus-
pension of a school's license if there is no licensed trainer 
in charge, was attacked in this case as violating due process 
because it contained no provisions for a hearing. 
Adopting most of the opinion of the court of appeal, second 
district, the supreme court sustained the statutory procedure. 
The opinion recognized that the general rule in California is 
that in the absence of a statute declaring otherwise, statutes 
ought to be construed to require a hearing before suspension of 
a license. Where there is a compelling public interest, however, 
summary suspension with "judicial review" thereafter does not 
violate due process.10 Section 7214, however, does not pro-
vide for either a hearing or "judicial review." Judicial review 
is available by resort to the statutory writ of mandate or by 
way of a petition for declaratory relief. It was this latter 
method that petitioner used in Eye Dog Foundation. It is 
apparent that the judicial review referred to here would be in 
the nature of a hearing during which a licensee would be per-
mitted to present evidence why his license should not have 
been suspended. Both the writ of mandate and the action 
for declaratory relief in California give the licensee a trial 
upon c'ontroverted issues of fact and thus fulfill due process 
requirements. ll 
The constitutionality of the hearing procedures under Cali-
fornia's "implied consent" law, Section 13353 of the Vehicle 
Code, was before the court in August v. Department of Motor 
Vehicles. 12 This statute requires the Department of Motor 
9. 67 Cal.2d 536, 63 Cal. Rptr. 21, § 72 and 15 Cal. Jur.2d DECLARATORY 
432 P.2d 717 (1967). RELIEF § 19. 
10. Escobedo v. State of California, 12. 264 Cal. App.2d 52, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950). 172 (1968). For further discussion of 
11. See 32 Cal. Jur.2d MANDAMUS this case, see Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW, in this volume. 
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Vehicles to suspend the driver's license of one who has refused 
to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content 
of his blood. But the procedure provides for notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before the suspension becomes 
effective. If the licensee does not request a formal hearing, 
he will be given an informal one.13 There are no detailed re-
quirements as to how an informal hearing must be conducted. 
The licensee is given an opportunity to attend, and to present 
and controvert evidence. The statute, however, does not re-
quire that the arresting officer testify in person or be sub-
jected to cross examination. In the instant case the licensee 
attended the informal hearing, without counsel, and made 
no objection to the use of the arresting officer's written state-
ments and reports. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the hear-
ing officer recommended that the license be suspended, though 
the court which had accepted the licensee's plea of guilty to 
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor had recom-
mended that the license not be suspended because the licensee's 
employment made it necessary for him to drive. 
The court held that the statutory procedure did not vio-
late due process. It recognized that due process did require 
a hearing at some time either before or after suspension and 
that one ought to have an opportunity to know all of the in-
formation being used against him and an opportunity to cross 
examine. This applies, the court stated, where there are dis-
puted questions of fact. In this case the licensee did not object 
to the information use by the hearing officer, therefore there 
were no disputed questions of fact. The court implied that 
had the licensee objected to the written evidence, it would 
have been necessary to have the arresting officer present and 
to afford the licensee an opportunity to cross examine him. 
This case follows the procedure outlined in previous cases 
which require a hearing at some point before final suspension 
of a driver's license. Although the licensee bears some burden 
with regard to the extent of the hearing he receives, it is 
apparent that if he objects to the use of the written statements 
13. Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 14100 and 
14104. 
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of the officer, such statements cannot be used alone without an 
opportunity for confrontation. 
State Cannot Make a Man an Outcast in His Own Pro-
fession Without a Hearing 
The case of Endler v. SchutzbanP4 presented the California 
Supreme Court with this unusual due process question: Is an 
individual entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard 
by a governmental agency which has taken no action against 
him, but, based on unproved accusations, threatens disci-
plinary action against third parties who employ him? 
The Commissioner of Corporations notified the plaintiff's 
employer that he had information that charged the plaintiff 
with forgery and embezzlement and that unless the employer 
discharged the plaintiff, the commissioner would take steps 
to suspend the license of the employer as a personal property 
broker. Ultimately the employer acquiesced and discharged 
plaintiff. The commissioner offered to conduct an informal 
hearing into the alleged charges but retained the right to 
threaten disciplinary action against any licensee who em-
ployed the plaintiff. Plaintiff refused to submit to such a 
hearing. Thereafter the commissioner, according to the plain-
tiff, "embarked upon a policy of 'directing its licensees . . . 
not to employ plaintiff on threat of revocation or suspension of 
their personal property broker's license.' "15 
Having found that it was virtually impossible to secure 
employment in California under these circumstances, plaintiff 
sought relief in the courts. The superior court dismissed the 
action but on appeal the supreme court reversed, concluding 
that the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing and unless given 
one by the commissioner, he was entitled to a declaration that 
the commissioner had acted arbitrarily and should be en-
14. 68 Cal.2d 162, 65 Cal. Rptr. 297, 15. 68 Cal.2d at 167, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
436 P.2d 297 (1968). For further dis- at 301, 436 P.2d at 301. 
cussion of this case, see Collings, 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, in this 
volume. 
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joined from further threatening licensees who desire to hire the 
plaintiff. 
Once it is accepted that plaintiff has an interest deserving 
of constitutional protection, the conclusion reached by the 
court is in accordance with due process standards. In 
this instance the interest of the plaintiff is to be able to follow 
any occupation he chooses. That interest cannot be de-
stroyed without complying with the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The court made a distinction between the Supreme Court 
cases of Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy16 and 
Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness17 by pointing 
out that in the former the government was regulating its own 
internal operations (the individual involved was working in 
a government arsenal), while in the latter the state was with-
holding a license to practice law. 
The government can demand more from its employees, the 
court implied, than from one who is seeking to follow a 
chosen trade or profession. If by this the court meant that 
the government as an employer may take good faith action, 
unencumbered by constitutional restrictions, against an em-
ployee based solely upon his fitness to perform his duties, the 
court would appear to be correct. 
Endler, however, is more like Willner, and therefore "the 
state may not make a man an outcast in his own profession 
without affording him a full opportunity to present his de-
fense. "18 Because the commissioner was not taking direct 
action against the plaintiff, the question of his standing to 
raise the issues was before the court. After reviewing a 
number of Supreme Court cases relating to standing, the court 
held that these cases 
Coupled with the holding of Willner, . . . establish 
the principle that any person whose freedom to pursue 
his profession is seriously restricted by an official action 
16. 367 U.S. 886, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230, 81 18. 68 Ca1.2d at 173, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
S.Ct. 1743 (1961). at 304, 436 P.2d at 304. 
17. 373 U.S. 96, 10 L.Ed.2d 224, 83 
S.C!. 1175, 2 A.L.R.3d 1254 (1963). 
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or course of conduct designed to discourage his employ-
ment may compel the government to afford him a hearing 
complying with the traditional requirements of due 
process. 19 
Justice Friedman in Rivera v. Division of Industrial Welfare 
of State20 characterized one of the issues as a "tug of war 
. between the employers' insistence upon a 'trial type' 
hearing featured by opportunities for confrontation, cross-
examination and rebuttal, and the commission's pursuit of a 
quasi-legislative or 'argument type' hearing. "1 
In this case the State Industrial Welfare Commission, after 
holding public meetings, issued certain orders relating to 
wages, hours, and working conditions for women and minors 
in industries handling products after harvest. During these 
hearings interested persons were allowed to appear and testify. 
In addition letters, statements, position papers, etc., were re-
ceived by the commission. Witnesses were given a limited 
time to testify, but no cross-examination or rebuttal were per-
mitted. 
In reaching its conclusion that the manner in which the 
hearings were conducted did not offend due process, the 
court stated that there was a distinction between adjudicative 
hearings and legislative hearings. Due process does require 
access to evidence and an opportunity for cross-examination 
and rebuttal in the former but not in the latter. In the in-
stant case the process before the commission was "quasi-
legislative" and because so related to the legislative process, 
the restrictive procedures with regard to gathering of informa-
tion upon which to base its order were permissible. 
In a footnote to this decision2 the court noted that Professor 
Davis in his treatise on administrative law,3 prefers an ap-
19. 68 Cal.2d at 178, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2. 265 Cal. App.2d at -, 71 Cal. 
at 308, 436 P.2d at 308. Rptr. at 75l. 
20. 265 Cal. App.2d -,71 Cal. Rptr. 3. Davis, Administratil'e Law Trea-
739 (1968). tise (1958). 
1. 265 Cal. App.2d at -, 71 Cal. 
Rptr. at 748. 
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proach that would determine the requirements of the hearing 
upon resolving the question of whether the facts to be found 
were adjudicative or legislative. Whether one uses the court's 
approach, i.e., characterizing the proceedings as either legisla-
tive or adjudicative, or that of Professor Davis, the result 
reached in the instant case would be the same, that the stat-
utory procedure was not constitutionally defective. The 
information being sought by the Commission here and the 
function it was performing were of the kind that was a prelude 
to the issuance of a general order respecting wages and hours. 
This was the kind of order that the legislature could have 
issued by the enactment of a statute without complying with 
due process requirements of notice and hearing. 
Eminent Domain Versus the Police Power 
"Courts do not lightly interfere with public agencies to 
whom regulatory police powers have been conferred. It is 
our obligation to do so, however, when unreasonable or arbi-
trary action becomes manifest." This statement was taken 
from Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Manufacturing v. County of 
San Joaquin. 4 It indicates that all is not lost for the citizen 
when the government seeks to exercise its almost all-powerful 
police power. What is even more encouraging is that the court 
which made that statement followed it by concrete action in 
ordering the issuance of a use permit unencumbered by con-
ditions the court held to be invalid. 
When petitioner sought a use permit from the county to 
enlarge its cabinet shop, the county tacked on several condi-
tions relating to the conveyance to the county of certain 
adjoining lands without compensation for eventual use in 
constructing an expressway. Recognizing that the govern-
ment could not function effectively if every diminution in 
value of property were compensable, the court nevertheless 
4. 257 Cal. App.2d 181 at 191, 65 Manuel, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, in this 
Cal. Rptr. 37 at 43-44 (1967). For volume. 
further discussion of this case, see 
CAL LAW 1969 295 
41
Leahy: Constitutional Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Constitutional Law 
found that in this case the county "was attempting to avoid the 
constitutional guarantee of payment of just compensation via 
the method of exacting 'conditions' to the granting of a use 
permit arbitrarily inspired and that in doing so it had exceeded 
its powers.,,5 
5. 257 Cal. App.2d at 189, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. at 42. 
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